Why AFRICOM Should Remain Independent: Preserving Strategic Agility through Dedicated Theater Command

Introduction: A Command for a Continent

Maintaining U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as an independent geographic combatant command (CCMD) is more than a bureaucratic decision—it is a strategic imperative as global competition intensifies. Proposals to merge AFRICOM with U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in the name of efficiency risk undercutting U.S. influence in one of the most dynamic, contested, and complex regions of the world.

As a former global force management (GFM) planner and incoming security cooperation officer assigned to Africa, I argue from firsthand experience. AFRICOM’s unique design, its weight of 4-star leadership, and its critical role in strategic competition and trans-regional challenges offer the clarity, prioritization, and responsiveness essential to meeting today’s—and tomorrow’s—strategic challenges.

Instead of subordinating AFRICOM to EUCOM, the Defense Department should pursue three targeted reforms to optimize AFRICOM’s utility: (1) Enhance Cross-Theater Synchronization to share resources without sacrificing strategic autonomy; (2) Expand Interagency Integration—in support of upcoming State Department restructuring—to better align military, diplomatic, and development efforts; and (3) Accelerate Data Architecture Modernization to create true efficiencies through automation, optimizing workflows, and exploiting data as a strategic asset.

AFRICOM’s Unique Design Meets a Unique Mission

Established in 2007, AFRICOM is unlike other CCMDs. Its small-footprint, light-touch approach—relying on partner capacity-building, interagency coordination, and regional engagement—enables persistent presence without permanent basing. With 53 countries in its area of responsibility, AFRICOM supports not only counterterrorism and crisis response but also long-term stability efforts against a backdrop of fragile states, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), humanitarian crises, and strategic competition with China and Russia. AFRICOM’s integrated civilian-military structure and low-cost operating model already make it one of the most efficient commands within the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Downgrading it to a sub-unified command under EUCOM would diminish that effectiveness and send the wrong message to partners and adversaries alike.

AFRICOM’s success stories underscore its tailored and effective approach. From facilitating the G5 Sahel Joint Force’s coordination efforts, to conducting logistics and medical partnerships with African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, AFRICOM has built a reputation as a trusted and reliable partner. Its support to Exercise FLINTLOCK and multinational operations in the Gulf of Guinea have increased maritime domain awareness and regional cooperation. In East Africa, its ongoing collaboration with Djiboutian and Somali partners has enabled a continued counterterrorism presence without large-scale deployments. These examples reveal that AFRICOM’s unique model allows it to respond nimbly across diverse political and operational environments—without triggering the backlash that often follows heavier U.S. military footprints.

Geographic and Strategic Complexity Demand 4-Star Level Focus

Africa is not monolithic. Regions like the Sahel, the Horn, the Gulf of Guinea, and Southern Africa each present unique operational environments and political dynamics. EUCOM, already stretched with NATO, Ukraine, and expanding security demands in the Arctic, cannot absorb Africa’s complexity without losing focus and further diluting its resources. Subordinating AFRICOM would risk treating the continent’s crises as peripheral concerns. The result would be slower decision-making, reduced prioritization, and minimal advocacy during the GFM process, where having a four-star general or flag officer at the table directly impacts force allocation.

Ongoing operations in Europe reinforce this concern. EUCOM’s focus on supporting Ukraine has consumed considerable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and strategic mobility, often leaving competing theaters like Africa with limited residual capacity. The situation mirrors challenges seen in past sub-unified arrangements—such as U.S. Forces Korea under INDOPACOM—where regional requirements have, at times, been deprioritized due to broader theater commitments. If AFRICOM were similarly subordinated, African contingencies could face delayed or diminished support in times of crisis, undermining long-term regional engagement and the ability to maintain influence.

Strategic Competition Requires a Clear Signal of Commitment

“Africa is a nexus theater where strategic competition is playing out in real time. We must remain present, credible, and engaged—or risk ceding influence to authoritarian rivals.”— General Michael Langley, AFRICOM Commander, 2025 Posture Statement

China and Russia are not hesitating in Africa. Beijing is building strategic infrastructure and digital ecosystems across the continent, ranging from the Peoples’ Liberation Army’s only overseas naval base in Djibouti to widespread Belt and Road investments like Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway. Likewise, Africa is becoming a central platform for Moscow’s global strategy via arms sales and security provision through the Wagner Group. In such a contested information environment, perception matters. Merging AFRICOM signals strategic retreat. This perceived disengagement could unravel years of trust-building, reduce access and influence, and open a vacuum for authoritarian competitors to exploit. U.S. Central Command is a cogent foreshadow—it already feels the effects of this abandonment narrative as China and Russia capitalize on reduced American engagement and force posture.

AFRICOM’s value must be understood within the broader framework of global campaigning as articulated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy and the Joint Concept for Competing. Both documents emphasize the importance of integrated deterrence and persistent engagement in the gray zone, where influence, access, and partnerships matter as much, if not more, than physical basing or troop levels. AFRICOM’s model directly supports these objectives by enabling presence without provocation, trust-building without coercion, and partnership without overextension. In an era defined by information dominance and strategic competition, the command’s agility and theater-specific focus make it indispensable.

Proponents of merging AFRICOM into EUCOM argue that such a move would streamline command relationships, reduce redundancy, and create efficiencies in logistics, infrastructure, and theater-level planning. They point to the dual-hatted nature of United States Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa (USAFE-AFAFRICA) and U.S. Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR-AF) and the potential for integrated support functions as justification. However, these theoretical efficiencies risk becoming operational liabilities.

Africa’s security challenges—marked by irregular threats, state fragility, and dynamic political landscapes—require tailored attention that cannot be absorbed into a command primarily focused on conventional deterrence in Europe. Combining commands may create the perception of efficiency based on saving staff billets, but the loss in dedicated senior advocacy, situational awareness, and responsiveness will create outsized operational risk to U.S. military forces operating on the content and outsized strategic risk to U.S. national security.

Both EUCOM Commander General Christopher Cavoli and AFRICOM Commander Gen. Michael Langley expressed strong reservations despite the short-term allure of cost savings, warning that merging the commands would create an unmanageable span of control and risk diluting focus on the distinct political and operational environments inherent to each theater.

What Happens in Africa Doesn’t Stay in Africa

Africa is also home to many additional threats that serve as strategic distractors to competition with China as our pacing threat. These include terrorism, pandemics, and human migration that all produce trans-regional spillover effects that have, and could again, directly impact the U.S. homeland. An independent and adequately resourced AFRICOM is critical to ensure that these threats do not metastasize.

As the “global epicenter of terrorism,” Africa now accounts for over half of all terrorism-related deaths. Groups like al-Shabaab, ISIS-West Africa, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) are expanding both their territorial control and transnational ambitions. Their ability to destabilize local governments and draw international fighters reflects a threat environment that extends beyond regional borders. AFRICOM’s ability to engage early and often with partner forces helps prevent localized threats from escalating into global ones.

Beginning in 2014, West Africa’s Ebola epidemic spread to seven additional countries across Europe (Italy, Spain, United Kingdom), Africa (Mali, Nigeria, Senegal) and most notably—the United States. AFRICOM’s response to the outbreak demonstrated its unique ability to rapidly organize logistics, medical response, and host-nation coordination at scale. In an era where pandemics travel faster than military deployments, early detection and forward engagement are critical. No other combatant command is designed with the interagency integration and light footprint needed to execute such missions across austere environments.

Mass irregular human migration from Africa also creates significant trans-regional spillover challenges. When Niger repealed its anti-trafficking law in early 2024, migrant flows to the European Union surged. The resulting political friction and humanitarian strain were direct consequences of fragile governance in the Sahel. Russia is also postured in the Sahel and Libya to leverage migrants as “hybrid weapons” to pressure Europe as part of its long-term gray zone political warfare campaign. As Europe grapples with migration challenges, it is AFRICOM—not EUCOM—that is best positioned to support African partners in maintaining border security and building rule-of-law institutions. Subordinating AFRICOM risks overlooking these complex relationships in favor of narrower Euro-Atlantic priorities.

A Better Approach: Optimize AFRICOM, Do Not Subordinate It

From my experience in GFM planning and Joint Staff sourcing forums, the presence of a combatant commander matters. Those with command-level representation have greater advocacy in competition for limited ISR platforms, special operations enablers, and expeditionary logistics. Reducing AFRICOM to a sub-unified command would diminish its ability to compete for the necessary capabilities to fulfill mission requirements—especially as competition below armed conflict intensifies.

Rather than consolidating AFRICOM with EUCOM, the Defense Department should pursue three targeted reforms to enhance its utility:

1. Enhance Cross-Theater Synchronization. Establish formal GFM coordination mechanisms with EUCOM and CENTCOM to share resources without sacrificing strategic autonomy. This would especially include ISR, mobility, and cyber assets to achieve outsized effects with minimal presence.
2. Expand Interagency Integration. Bolster civilian presence within AFRICOM HQ and joint planning structures to align diplomatic and development efforts more tightly with military objectives. This would align with and support the upcoming State Department restructuring intended to streamline regional bureaus and embassies to increase functionality.
3. Accelerate Data Architecture Modernization. Leverage commercial software and artificial intelligence to digitize existing processes and improve decision-making. True efficiencies—and increased effectiveness, can be found in automation, optimizing workflows, and exploiting data as a strategic asset. This would align with Defense Secretary Hegseth’s recent directive for all Defense Department components to embrace rapid software acquisition pathways and commercial solutions, similar to EUCOM’s current modernization efforts.

Conclusion: Posture and Partnerships Reflect Priorities

AFRICOM is not a Cold War legacy command, but a modern platform tailored for irregular, political-military competition. Maintaining its independent combatant command status signals enduring United States commitment to regional security, governance, and development—inclusive of not just Africa, but also Europe and the Middle East. Any perceived downgrading will reverberate far beyond Stuttgart.

General Langley, in his 2025 Senate Armed Services Committee posture statement, emphasized that Africa is a “nexus theater” where global interests converge—rapidly emerging as a focal point of strategic competition with its youth-dominant population, economic potential, and strategic geography. Langley warned that Chinese and Russian influence operations are accelerating, leveraging infrastructure investments, digital platforms, and security partnerships to outpace U.S. efforts. The proximity of China’s only overseas military base to U.S. forces in Djibouti, as well as its geographic position as a chokepoint to the Red Sea, underscore the urgency of maintaining a dedicated command focused on African dynamics.

This is not only a moment of urgency, but also of opportunity. As highlighted by Vice Adm. Thomas Ishee, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa, Africa presents an opening for increased U.S. military training, assistance, and engagement that aligns with mutual security interests. By empowering regional partners and expanding persistent presence, the United States can shape African outcomes that reinforce global stability and uphold democratic norms. AFRICOM, as the platform for that engagement, should be optimized, not merged, if we are to lead where it matters most.

Looking beyond security, the United States has a long-term interest in the continent’s economic potential. Africa’s population is projected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050—more than six times that of the United States—making it the fastest-growing labor and consumer base on the planet. While the continent’s combined GDP currently trails that of the United States by a wide margin, it has the potential to double or even quadruple its purchasing power and middle-class growth over the coming decades. This emerging demographic and economic powerhouse will help shape the global economy in the second half of the 21st century. Do we want to cede that future relationship—and the influence it brings—solely to China AFRICOM is the connective tissue that can help the United States maintain that stake in Africa’s trajectory.

If the United States is serious about competing globally while remaining agile and effective, it must back words with action. In the 21st-century contest for influence, presence is power—and AFRICOM must stand independent to be present where it matters most.

(Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.)

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